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Abstract
We give a strict mathematical description for a refinement of the Marinatto-Weber quantum game scheme.
The model allows the players to choose projector operators that determine the state on which they perform their
local operators. The game induced by the scheme generalizes finite strategic form game. In particular, it covers
normal representations of extensive games, i.e., strategic games generated by extensive ones. We illustrate our
idea with an example of extensive game and prove that rational choices in the classical game and its quantum
counterpart may lead to significantly different outcomes.
1 Introduction
A 15-year-period research on quantum games results in many ideas of how a quantum game might look like and
how it might be played. Certainly, the quantum scheme for 2× 2 games introduced in [1] (the EWL scheme) has
become one of the most common models and it has already found application in more complex games (see, for
example, [2]). However, the more complex a classical game is, the more sophisticated techniques are required to
find optimal players’ strategies in the EWL-type scheme. While in the scheme for 2× 2 games the result of the
game depends on six real parameters (each players’ strategy is a unitary operator from SU(2), and it is defined
by three real parameters), the EWL-type scheme for 3× 3 games would already require 16 parameters to take
into account [3], [4]. One way to avoid cumbersome calculations when studying a game in the quantum domain
was presented in [5] (see also recent papers [6], [7] [8] and [9] based on this scheme). The authors defined a
model (the MW scheme) for quantum game where the players’ unitary strategies were restricted to the identity
and bit-flip operator. Then, the game became quantum if the players’ local operators were performed on some
fixed entangled state |Ψ〉 (called the players’ joint strategy). The MW scheme appears to be much simpler than
the EWL scheme. The number of pure strategies of each player is the same as in the classical game [10]. Thus,
the complexity of finding a rational solution is similar in both a classical game and the corresponding quantum
counterpart. Unfortunately, that simple scheme exhibits some undesirable properties that we pointed out in [11].
First, the MW scheme implies non-classical game even if the players’ joint strategy is an unentangled state. In
particular, if a player’s qubit is in an equal superposition of computational basis states, she cannot affect the game
outcome in contrast to her strategic position in the classical game. Moreover, the players have no impact on the
form of the initial state. In paper [11] we showed that the above-mentioned drawbacks vanish by allowing the
players to choose between the basis state that represents the classical game and the state |Ψ〉. In this paper, we
continue that line of research. We give a formal description for players’ strategies to include the choice of the
initial state in the MW scheme. It will allow us to move beyond bimatrix games examined in [11] and consider
more general normal form games. Then we study possible applications of the scheme.
Some knowledge of game theory is required to follow this paper. While theory of bimatrix games is commonly
used in quantum game theory, the notion of normal representation of extensive games may not be known for readers
that deal with quantum games. Therefore, we encourage the reader who is not familiar with extensive game theory
to see one of the textbooks [12], [13].
2 Refinement of the Marinatto-Weber scheme
In paper [11] we introduced a new scheme for playing finite bimatrix games in the quantum domain. The idea
behind the scheme is that the players can choose whether they play a classical game or its quantum counterpart
defined by the MW scheme. In the case of quantum model for 2× 2 bimatrix games, this means that the players
choose their local operations: the identity 1 or the Pauli operator σx and additionally they decide whether the
chosen operators are performed on state |00〉 or some fixed state |Ψ〉 ∈C2⊗C2. Now, we give a formal description
for the scheme.
1
2.1 Quantum model for 2×2 bimatrix game
Let us consider a 2× 2 game (
(a00,b00) (a01,b01)
(a10,b10) (a11,b11)
)
, where (ai j,bi j) ∈R2. (1)
The quantum scheme for game (1) is defined on an inner product space (C2)⊗4 by the following components:
1. A positive operator H,
H = (1⊗1−|11〉〈11|)⊗|00〉〈00|+ |11〉〈11|⊗ |Ψ〉〈Ψ|, (2)
where |Ψ〉 ∈ C2⊗C2 such that ‖|Ψ〉‖= 1,
2. Players’ pure strategies: P(1)i ⊗U (3)j for player 1, P(2)k ⊗U
(4)
l for player 2, where i, j,k, l = 0,1, and the upper
indices identify the subspace C2 of (C2)⊗4 on which the operators
P0 = |0〉〈0|, P1 = |1〉〈1|, U0 = 1, U1 = σx, (3)
are defined. That is, player 1 acts on the first and third qubit, player 2 acts on the second and fourth one. The
order of qubits is in line with the upper indices.
3. Measurement operators M1 and M2 given by formula
M1(2) = 1⊗1⊗
(
∑
x,y=0,1
axy(bxy)|xy〉〈xy|
)
, (4)
where axy and bxy are the payoffs from (1).
The scheme proceeds in the similar way as the MW scheme or the EWL scheme—the players determine the final
state by choosing their strategies and acting on operator H. As a result, they determine the following density
operator:
ρf =
(
P(1)i ⊗P(2)k ⊗U (3)j ⊗U (4)l
)
H
(
P(1)i ⊗P(2)k ⊗U (3)j ⊗U (4)l
)
=


|11〉〈11|⊗
(
U (3)j ⊗U (4)l |Ψ〉〈Ψ|U
(3)
j ⊗U (4)l
)
if i = k = 1
|ik〉〈ik|⊗
(
U (3)j ⊗U (4)l |00〉〈00|U (3)j ⊗U (4)l
)
otherwise.
(5)
Next, the payoffs for player 1 and 2 are
tr(ρfM1) and tr(ρfM2). (6)
Similar to the MW scheme, each player is allowed to use mixed strategies, i.e., to choose her own strategies accord-
ing to some probability distribution. Let (pi j)i j=0,1 be a probability distribution over the set
{
P(1)i ⊗U (3)j : i, j = 0,1
}
,
and (qkl)k,l=0,1 be a probability distribution over
{
P(2)k ⊗U
(4)
l : k, l = 0,1
}
. Then the resulting density operator
takes the form
ρf = ∑
i, j,k,l=0,1
pi jqkl
(
P(1)i ⊗P(2)k ⊗U
(3)
j ⊗U (4)l
)
H
(
P(1)i ⊗P(2)k ⊗U
(3)
j ⊗U (4)l
)
. (7)
Note that scheme (2)-(4) generalizes the classical way of playing the game. If the players’ strategy profile takes
the form
P(1)0 ⊗P(2)0 ⊗U (3)j ⊗U (4)l , (8)
the players’ payoffs depend on U (3)j and U
(4)
l and are equal to
tr
((
U (3)j ⊗U (4)l |00〉〈00|U
(3)
j ⊗U (4)l
)
∑
x,y=0,1
axy(bxy)|xy〉〈xy|
)
= a jl(b jl). (9)
Obviously, if U (3)j and U
(4)
j are chosen according to some probability distributions {p00, p01} and {q00,q01},
respectively, the resulting distribution over a jl(b jl) coincides with one given by the corresponding mixed strategy
profile in game (1). As a result, scheme (2)-(4) determines a game that is a complete quantization of (1) (see [14]
for the definition of complete quantization).
2
Nash equilibrium In non-cooperative quantum game theory, Nash equilibrium is the most used solution concept.
It is defined as a profile of strategies of all players in which each strategy is a best response to the other strate-
gies. In view of scheme (2)-(4), it is a mixed strategy profile
(
(p∗i j)i, j=0,1,(q∗kl)i, j=0,1
)
that solves the following
optimization problems:
(p∗i j) ∈ argmax
(pi j)
tr
(
∑
i, j,k,l=0,1
pi jq∗klSik jlHSik jlM1
)
, (10)
(q∗kl) ∈ argmax
(qkl)
tr
(
∑
i, j,k,l=0,1
p∗i jqklSik jlHSik jlM2
)
, (11)
where Sik jl = P
(1)
i ⊗P(2)k ⊗U (3)j ⊗U (4)l . Like in the classical game theory, we can simplify conditions (10) and (11)
and only check if (p∗i j) or (q∗kl) yields a payoff that is equal to a maximum payoff when choosing pure strategies.
More formally, condition (10) is equivalent to the following one
tr
(
∑
i, j,k,l=0,1
p∗i jq
∗
klSik jlHSik jlM1
)
= max
i, j=0,1
tr
(
∑
k,l=0,1
q∗klSik jlHSik jlM1
)
. (12)
It follows from the fact that tr(ρfM1) for density operator ρf given by (7) is a convex combination of elements
tr
(
∑
k,l=0,1
q∗klSik jlHSik jlM1
)
for i, j = 0,1 (13)
with weights pi j. In similar way we can simplify condition (11).
Bimatrix form The game given by scheme (2)-(4) can be expressed in terms of bimatrix form. Each entry of the
bimatrix is a pair (tr(ρfM1), tr(ρfM2)) of payoffs that corresponds to a particular profile P(1)i ⊗P(2)k ⊗U
(3)
j ⊗U (4)l .
As a result, we obtain


P(2)0 ⊗U (4)0 P(2)0 ⊗U (4)1 P(2)1 ⊗U (4)0 P(2)1 ⊗U (4)1
P(1)0 ⊗U (3)0 (a00,b00) (a01,b01) (a00,b00) (a01,b01)
P(1)0 ⊗U (3)1 (a10,b10) (a11,b11) (a10,b10) (a11,b11)
P(1)1 ⊗U (3)0 (a00,b00) (a01,b01) (α00,β00) (α01,β01)
P(1)1 ⊗U (3)1 (a10,b10) (a11,b11) (α10,β10) (α11,β11)

, (14)
where
(αi j ,βi j) = (tr(ρi jM1), tr(ρi jM2)) for ρi j = |11〉〈11|⊗ (Ui ⊗U j|Ψ〉〈Ψ|Ui ⊗U j) . (15)
Bimatrix (14) is a very convenient way to study the game determined by scheme (2)-(4). Once, the entries
(tr(ρfM1), tr(ρfM2)) are specified, we can leave quantum formalism out and use (14). This is due to the linearity
of trace that makes a density operator (7) and the corresponding probability distribution over pure strategies equiv-
alent in a sense of generated outcomes. For example, in order to find Nash equilibria we can use the techniques for
bimatrix games instead of conditions (10) and (11).
Note that bimatrix (14) clearly shows the role of components Pi of players’ strategies. Namely, the operations
U (3)j ⊗U (4)l are preformed on state |Ψ〉 if and only if both players form profile P
(1)
1 ⊗P(2)1 ⊗U (3)j ⊗U (4)l .
The scheme can be generalized to include more than one joint strategy |Ψ〉. Let us define operator H on
(Cn⊗Cn)⊗ (C2⊗C2),
H =
(
1n2×n2 −
n
∑
i=1
|ii〉〈ii|
)
⊗|00〉〈00|+
n
∑
i=1
|ii〉〈ii|⊗ |Ψi〉〈Ψi| (16)
and players’ pure strategies
P(1)i ⊗U (3)j ,P(2)k ⊗U
(4)
l ∈ {|0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1|, . . . , |n〉〈n|}⊗{1,σx}. (17)
In this case, the local operators U (3)j ⊗U (4)l are performed on state |Ψi〉 if and only if the resulting stategy profile
takes the form |ii〉〈ii|⊗U (3)j ⊗U (4)l .
3
2.2 Quantum model for general bimatrix games
We showed in [?] how to construct the scheme for any finite bimatrix game according to the MW model. The key
elements of the scheme are appropriately defined operators for players. In the case of (n+ 1)× (m+ 1) bimatrix
game, 

(a00,b00) (a01,b01) · · · (a0m,b0m)
(a10,b10) (a11,b11) · · · (a1m,b1m)
...
...
. . .
...
(an0,bn0) (an1,bn1) · · · (anm,bnm)

 , (ai j,bi j) ∈R2. (18)
where n,m ≥ 1, player 1 (player 2) has n+ 1 operators Ui (m+ 1 operators V j) defined on space Cn+1 (Cm+1) that
act on basis states {|0〉, |1〉, . . . , |n〉} ({|0〉, |1〉, . . . , |m〉}) as follows:
U0|i〉= |i〉, U1|i〉= |i+ 1 mod n+ 1〉, . . . Un|i〉= |i+ n mod n+ 1〉; (19)
V0|i〉= |i〉, V1|i〉= |i+ 1 mod m+ 1〉, . . . Vm|i〉= |i+m mod m+ 1〉. (20)
In view of (19) and (20), scheme (2)-(4) can be generalized by the players’ strategies
{P0,P1}⊗{U0,U1, . . . ,Un} and {P0,P1}⊗{V0,V1, . . . ,Vm}. (21)
and the positive operator having the same form as (2), but with the outer product operators |00〉〈00|, |Ψ〉〈Ψ| defined
on Cn+1⊗Cm+1.
3 Quantum approach to finite normal form games
In the previous section we formalized the refinement of the MW scheme that was introduced in [11]. We obtained
the scheme that can be applied to any finite bimatrix game. In this section, we construct a framework for general
normal-form games. The term of normal-form game has two main meanings. One concerns a strategic game given
a priori. It is defined by triple (N,{Si}i∈N ,{ui}i∈N), where N is a set of players and, for i ∈ N, components Si
and ui are player i’s strategy set and payoff function, respectively. The second meaning concerns a strategic game
(N,{Si}i∈N ,{ui}i∈N) that is generated by a game in extensive form. The strategic game obtained in this way is
called the normal representation of the extensive game. In what follows, we extend the scheme (2)-(4) to cover
both cases.
3.1 Strategic-form game
The difference between bimatrix games and finite strategic games is that more than two players (say n players) are
allowed in the latter case. Therefore, operator (2) has to be modified in such a way that it simply outputs a density
operator after n players’ strategies act on it.
For simplicity of our analysis we restrict our attention to n-person strategic games with each Si having two
elements. The extension of scheme (2)-(4) is defined now on space (C2)⊗n⊗ (C2)⊗n with the positive operator H,
H =
(
1
⊗n− (|1〉〈1|)⊗n)⊗ (|0〉〈0|)⊗n +(|1〉〈1|)⊗n⊗|Ψ〉〈Ψ|, (22)
where |Ψ〉 ∈ (C2)⊗n, ‖|Ψ〉‖ = 1. Each player i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} has a strategy determined by (3) that acts on qubits i
and n+ i, i.e., it is on the form P(i)ji ⊗U
(n+i)
jn+i , where ji, jn+i = 0,1. As a result, a profile of players’ strategies forms
operator
(⊗n
i=1 P
(i)
ji
)
⊗
(⊗n
i=1 U
(n+i)
jn+i
)
that results in the following density operator:
ρf =
[(
n⊗
i=1
P(i)ji
)
⊗
(
n⊗
i=1
U (n+i)jn+i
)]
H
[(
n⊗
i=1
P(i)ji
)
⊗
(
n⊗
i=1
U (n+i)jn+i
)]
=


(|1〉〈1|)⊗n⊗
[(⊗n
i=1 U
(n+i)
jn+i
)
|Ψ〉〈Ψ|
(⊗n
i=1 U
(n+i)
jn+i
)]
if j1, . . . , jn = 1⊗n
i=1 | ji〉〈 ji|⊗
[(⊗n
i=1 U
(n+i)
jn+i
)
(|0〉〈0|)⊗n
(⊗n
i=1 U
(n+i)
jn+i
)]
otherwise.
(23)
Finally, we define for each player i the payoff measurement Mi,
Mi = 1⊗n⊗
(
∑
x1,...,xn=0,1
aix1,...,xn |x1 . . .xn〉〈x1 . . .xn|
)
, (24)
where aix1,...,xn is player i’s payoff in the classical game that corresponds to strategy profile consisting of (x1 +1)th
strategy of player 1, (x2 + 1) strategy of player 2, . . . , (xn + 1) strategy of player n. It is not difficult to check that
4
scheme (22)-(24) generalizes a n-person strategic game with two strategies for each player. If the joint strategy
|Ψ〉 is not played, i.e., element
(⊗n
i=1 P
(i)
ji
)
of a strategy profile is not equal to (|1〉〈1|)⊗n, then
tr
[(
n⊗
i=1
| ji〉〈 ji|
)
⊗
[(
n⊗
i=1
U (n+i)jn+i
)
(|0〉〈0|)⊗n
(
n⊗
i=1
U (n+i)jn+i
)]
Mi
]
= tr
[(
n⊗
i=1
| ji〉〈 ji|
)
⊗
(
n⊗
i=1
| jn+i〉〈 jn+i|
)
Mi
]
= a jn+1,...,2n . (25)
Thus, for strategic-form game (N,{Si}i∈N ,{ui}i∈N),
N = {1, . . . ,n}, Si =
{
s
(i)
0 ,s
(i)
1
}
, ui
(
s
(1)
k1 , . . . ,s
(n)
kn
)
= aik1,...,kn . (26)
The game generated by scheme (22)-(24) is equivalent to game (26) if strategies s(i)0 and s(i)1 are identified, respec-
tively, with U (n+i)0 and U
(n+i)
1 for each i.
Example 1 Let us consider the three-person Prisoner’s Dilemma that was studied in the quantum domain (via the
EWL scheme) by Du et al. [15]. In terms of matrices the game is defined as follows:
P 3
P 2 P 2
P 1
(
(3,3,3) (2,5,2)
(5,2,2) (4,4,0)
) (
(2,2,5) (0,4,4)
(4,0,4) (1,1,1)
)
.
(27)
Here, player 1 and 2 choose between the rows and the columns, respectively, whereas player 3 chooses between the
matrices. We recall that the only Nash equilibrium in (27) is a profile consisting of the players’ second strategies.
Thus, the most reasonable result of the game is (1,1,1). Similar to the best-known 2-person Prisoner’s Dilemma,
the players would increase their payoffs if at least two of them played their first strategies. However, the first
strategy cannot be played by a rational player since for each profile of the opponents’ strategies this strategy
always yields a worse payoff than the second strategy. In what follows, we apply scheme (22)-(24) to game (27).
According to the reasoning used immediately before Example 1, we identify each player’s strategies in game (27)
with local operators U0 and U1. Moreover, let us assume that player i, i = 1,2,3 acts on the system of ith and
(i+ 3)th qubit. As a result, scheme (22)-(24) comes down to one defined on (C2)⊗3 ⊗ (C2)⊗3 with the positive
operator
H =
(
1
⊗3−|111〉〈111|)⊗|000〉〈000|+ |111〉〈111|⊗ |Ψ〉〈Ψ|, (28)
the player i’s strategy set {
P(i)0 ⊗U (i+3)0 ,P(i)0 ⊗U (i+3)1 ,P(i)1 ⊗U (i+3)0 ,P(i)1 ⊗U (i+3)1
}
, (29)
and the triple of payoff operators
(M1,M2,M3) = 1⊗3⊗
[
(3,3,3)|000〉〈000|+(2,2,5)|001〉〈001|+(2,5,2)|010〉〈010|
+(0,4,4)|011〉〈011|+(5,2,2)|100〉〈100|+(4,0,4)|101〉〈101|
+(4,4,0)|110〉〈110|+(1,1,1)|111〉〈111|]. (30)
Let us fix now the players’ joint strategy |Ψ〉 as:
|Ψ〉= 1
2
(|001〉+ |010〉+ |100〉+ |111〉) (31)
and determine the resulting players’ payoffs that correspond to profiles
3⊗
k=1
P(k)jk ⊗
6⊗
k=4
U (k)jk , jk ∈ {0,1}. (32)
Note that for fixed
⊗6
k=4 U
(k)
jk the value
tr
[(
3⊗
k=1
P(k)jk ⊗
6⊗
k=4
U (k)jk
)
H
(
3⊗
k=1
P(k)jk ⊗
6⊗
k=4
U (k)jk
)
Mi
]
, i = 1,2,3 (33)
5
is the same for each
⊗3
k=1 P
(k)
jk , |111〉〈111|. Therefore the problem of determining all the 64 payoff profiles
actually reduces to determining 64− 6 ·8= 16 of them. For example,(
P(1)1 ⊗P(2)0 ⊗P(3)0 ⊗U (4)0 ⊗U (5)0 ⊗U (6)1
)
H
(
P(1)1 ⊗P(2)0 ⊗P(3)0 ⊗U (4)0 ⊗U (5)0 ⊗U (6)1
)
= |100〉〈100|⊗
(
U (4)0 ⊗U (5)0 ⊗U (6)1
)
|000〉〈000|
(
U (4)0 ⊗U (5)0 ⊗U (6)1
)
= |100〉〈100|⊗ |001〉〈001|. (34)
Then,
tr(|100〉〈100|⊗ |001〉〈001|Mi) =
{
2 if i ∈ {1,2}
5 if i = 3. (35)
Hence, we obtain the same payoffs if P(1)1 ⊗P(2)0 ⊗P(3)0 is replaced by P(1)j1 ⊗P
(2)
j2 ⊗P
(3)
j3 , |111〉〈111|. For case
P(1)1 ⊗P(2)1 ⊗P(3)1 , we have(
P(1)1 ⊗P(2)1 ⊗P(3)1 ⊗U (4)0 ⊗U (5)0 ⊗U (6)1
)
H
(
P(1)1 ⊗P(2)1 ⊗P(3)1 ⊗U (4)0 ⊗U (5)0 ⊗U (6)1
)
= |111〉〈111|⊗
(
U (4)0 ⊗U (5)0 ⊗U (6)1
)
|Ψ〉〈Ψ|
(
U (4)0 ⊗U (5)0 ⊗U (6)1
)
= |111〉〈111|⊗ (|Ψ′〉〈Ψ′|) , (36)
where |Ψ′〉= (|000〉+ |011〉+ |101〉+ |110〉)/2. State (36) implies the payoff
tr
[
|111〉〈111|⊗
(
U (4)0 ⊗U (5)0 ⊗U (6)1
)
|Ψ〉〈Ψ|
(
U (4)0 ⊗U (5)0 ⊗U (6)1
)
Mi
]
=
11
4
(37)
for each i = 1,2,3. Having determined the payoffs associated with each strategy profile, we can describe the game
given by scheme (28)-(30) with the use of four matrices
P(3)0 ⊗U (6)0


P(2)0 ⊗U (5)0 P(2)0 ⊗U (5)1 P(2)1 ⊗U (5)0 P(2)1 ⊗U (5)1
P(1)0 ⊗U (4)0 (3,3,3) (2,5,2) (3,3,3) (2,5,2)
P(1)0 ⊗U (4)1 (5,2,2) (4,4,0) (5,2,2) (4,4,0)
P(1)1 ⊗U (4)0 (3,3,3) (2,5,2) (3,3,3) (2,5,2)
P(1)1 ⊗U (4)1 (5,2,2) (4,4,0) (5,2,2) (4,4,0)


P(3)0 ⊗U (6)1


P(2)0 ⊗U (5)0 P(2)0 ⊗U (5)1 P(2)1 ⊗U (5)0 P(2)1 ⊗U (5)1
P(1)0 ⊗U (4)0 (2,2,5) (0,4,4) (2,2,5) (0,4,4)
P(1)0 ⊗U (4)1 (4,0,4) (1,1,1) (4,0,4) (1,1,1)
P(1)1 ⊗U (4)0 (2,2,5) (0,4,4) (2,2,5) (0,4,4)
P(1)1 ⊗U (4)1 (4,0,4) (1,1,1) (4,0,4) (1,1,1)


P(3)1 ⊗U (6)0


P(2)0 ⊗U (5)0 P(2)0 ⊗U (5)1 P(2)1 ⊗U (5)0 P(2)1 ⊗U (5)1
P(1)0 ⊗U (4)0 (3,3,3) (2,5,2) (3,3,3) (2,5,2)
P(1)0 ⊗U (4)1 (5,2,2) (4,4,0) (5,2,2) (4,4,0)
P(1)1 ⊗U (4)0 (3,3,3) (2,5,2) ( 52 , 52 , 52 ) ( 114 , 114 , 114 )
P(1)1 ⊗U (4)1 (5,2,2) (4,4,0) ( 114 , 114 , 114 ) ( 52 , 52 , 52 )


P(3)1 ⊗U (6)1


P(2)0 ⊗U (5)0 P(2)0 ⊗U (5)1 P(2)1 ⊗U (5)0 P(2)1 ⊗U (5)1
P(1)0 ⊗U (4)0 (2,2,5) (0,4,4) (2,2,5) (0,4,4)
P(1)0 ⊗U (4)1 (4,0,4) (1,1,1) (4,0,4) (1,1,1)
P(1)1 ⊗U (4)0 (2,2,5) (0,4,4) ( 114 , 114 , 114 ) ( 52 , 52 , 52 )
P(1)1 ⊗U (4)1 (4,0,4) (1,1,1) ( 52 , 52 , 52 ) ( 114 , 114 , 114 )


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We see from the matrix representation that there are two types of pure Nash equilibria. The first one corresponds
to the unique equilibrium in game (27), and it is generated by profiles
3⊗
k=1
P(k)jk ⊗
6⊗
k=4
U (k)1 , where ( j1, j2, j3) ∈ {(0,0,0),(1,0,0),(0,1,0),(0,0,1)}. (38)
Each profile of (38) is a Nash equilibrium since each player’s unilateral deviation from the equilibrium strategy
yields the payoff 0 or 1. It also follows from the construction of (22)-(24). Namely, if a player cannot cause the joint
strategy |Ψ〉 to be played by changing her own strategy, the equilibrium analysis is restricted to studying the local
operations on state |000〉. That, in turn, coincides with the problem of finding Nash equilibria in game (27), and⊗6
k=4 U
(k)
1 is just the counterpart of the profile of the players’ second strategies that forms the unique equilibrium
in (27). However, in contrast to (27), the quantum game has another equilibrium given by profile
3⊗
k=1
P(k)1 ⊗
6⊗
k=4
U (k)1 . (39)
Indeed, player 1 suffers a loss of at least 1/4 by unilaterally deviation from strategy P(1)1 ⊗U (4)1 and the same occurs
in the case of player 2 and 3. Profile (39) is more profitable than (38) since it implies 11/4 for each player instead
of 1. Thus, the players gain by making use of the joint strategy |Ψ〉, i.e., by playing ⊗3k=1 P(k)1 .
3.2 Normal representation of extensive games
Given an extensive form game, one can construct a representation of that game in the strategic (normal) form. The
resulting strategic game and the given extensive game have the same set of players and the same set of strategies
for each player. The payoff functions are determined by the payoffs generated by the strategies in the extensive
game. The normal representation appears to be a very convenient way to study the extensive game. In particular,
while we lose the sequential structure, we obtain the sufficient and easier form of the game to find all the Nash
equilibria.
In our earlier paper [16], we introduced a quantum scheme for playing an extensive game by using its normal
representation. Basing on the MW and EWL schemes, we assigned an action at each information set in an extensive
game to a local operation on a particular qubit in the quantum game. As a result, a number of qubits on which each
player was allowed to specify local operations was equal to the number of their information sets. In what follows,
we extend our idea to the refinement of the MW scheme. This means that in addition to multiple choice of 1 and
σx, the players specify the state on which they perform the local operators.
Let us modify (22) to cover the normal-form game determined by an extensive game with the set of players
{1,2, . . . ,k} and n information sets, n ≥ k. The positive operator is now defined on (C2)⊗k ⊗ (C2)⊗n by formula
H =
(
1
⊗k − (|1〉〈1|)⊗k
)
⊗ (|0〉〈0|)⊗n +(|1〉〈1|)⊗k⊗|Ψ〉〈Ψ|, (40)
where |Ψ〉 ∈ (C2)⊗n and ‖|Ψ〉‖= 1. Let ξ : {k+1,k+2, . . . ,k+n}→ {1,2, . . . ,k} be a surjective map. We define
player i’s set of strategies as follows
P(i)ji ⊗
⊗
y∈ξ−1(i)
U (y)jy : ji, jy ∈ {0,1}, i = 1,2, . . . ,k}

 , (41)
where P(i)ji and U
(y)
jy are defined by (3). As an possible application of (40)-(41), let us consider the following
example:
Example 2 (Four-stage centipede game) A centipede game is a 2-person extensive game in which the players
move one after another for finitely many rounds. In some sense, it can be treated as an extensive counterpart of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma. While both players are able to obtain a high payoff, their rationality leads them to one of the
worst outcomes. An example of a four-stage centipede game is shown in Fig. 1. Each player has two information
sets (in this case, they are represented by the nodes of the game tree) with two available actions at each of them.
Each player can stop the game (action S) or continue the game (action C), giving the opportunity to the other
player to make her choice. One way to learn how the game may end is by backward induction. If player 2 is
to choose at her second information set, she certainly plays action S since she obtains 5 instead of 4—the result
of playing action C. Since players’ rationality is common knowledge, player 1 knows that by playing C at her
second information she ends up with payoff 3. Thus, player 1 chooses S that yields 4. Similar analysis shows that
the players choose action S at their first information sets. Consequently, the backward induction predicts outcome
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Figure 1: Extensive form representation of a four-stage centipede game (left) and the corresponding payoff poly-
tope (right).
(2,0). As we focus on normal form games, we construct the normal representation associated with the game in
Fig. 1. Let us first determine the players’ strategies. We recall that a player’s strategy in an extensive game is a
function that assigns an action to each information set of that player. Thus, each player has four strategies in the
case of a four-stage centipede game. They can be written in the form SS,SC,CS and CC, where, for example, CS
means that a player chooses C at her first information set and S at the second one. Once the strategies are specified,
we determine the payoffs that correspond to all possible strategy profiles. For example, (SC,CC) determines
outcome (2,0) since player 1’s strategy SC specifies action S at her first information set. On the other hand, profile
(CC,CS) corresponds to payoff (3,5) as player 1 always plays C and player 2 chooses S at her second information
set. The players’ strategies together with the payoffs corresponding to the strategy profiles define the following
normal representation


SS SC CS CC
SS (2,0) (2,0) (2,0) (2,0)
SC (2,0) (2,0) (2,0) (2,0)
CS (1,3) (1,3) (4,2) (4,2)
CC (1,3) (1,3) (3,5) (6,4)

. (42)
By using bimatrix (42), we can learn that rational players always choose action S at their first information sets.
More formally, there are four pure Nash equilibria: (SS,SS),(SS,SC),(SC,SS) and (SC,SC), each resulting in
outcome (2,0).
Let us consider the four-stage centipede game in terms of (40)-(41). We have k = 2 and n = 4. Thus, opera-
tor (40) comes down to
H = (1⊗1−|11〉〈11|)⊗|0000〉〈0000|+ |11〉〈11|⊗ |Ψ〉〈Ψ|. (43)
Let us assume that player 1 (player 2) performs her local operations on third and fifth (fourth and sixth) qubit,
i.e., we define a map ξ : {3,4,5,6}→ {1,2} by setting ξ ({3,5}) = {1} and ξ ({4,6}) = {2}. According to (41),
player 1 and player 2’s strategies take the form, respectively,
P(1)j1 ⊗U
(3)
j3 ⊗U
(5)
j5 and P
(2)
j2 ⊗U
(4)
j4 ⊗U
(6)
j6 for jk ∈ {0,1}. (44)
In order to generalize game (42), we specify payoff operators (24) as follows
(M1,M2) = 1⊗1⊗
(
(2,0)∑
x2,x3,x4∈{0,1}
|0x2x3x4〉〈0x2x3x4|+(1,3)∑
x3,x4∈{0,1}
|10x3x4〉〈10x3x4|
+(4,2)∑
x4∈{0,1}
|110x4〉〈110x4|+(3,5)|1110〉〈1110|+(6,4)|1111〉〈1111|
)
.
Setting |Ψ〉= (|1010〉+ |1011〉)/√2 and determining
tr
[(
P(1)j1 ⊗P
(2)
j2 ⊗
6⊗
k=3
U (k)jk
)
H
(
P(1)j1 ⊗P
(2)
j2 ⊗
6⊗
k=3
U (k)jk
)
Mi
]
(45)
for player i ∈ {1,2} and j1, . . . , j6 ∈ {0,1}, we obtain the following normal form game:


B000 B001 B010 B011 B100 B101 B110 B111
A000 (2,0) (2,0) (2,0) (2,0) (2,0) (2,0) (2,0) (2,0)
A001 (2,0) (2,0) (2,0) (2,0) (2,0) (2,0) (2,0) (2,0)
A010 (1,3) (1,3) (4,2) (4,2) (1,3) (1,3) (4,2) (4,2)
A011 (1,3) (1,3) (3,5) (6,4) (1,3) (1,3) (3,5) (6,4)
A100 (2,0) (2,0) (2,0) (2,0) (1,3) (1,3) ( 92 ,
9
2 ) (
9
2 ,
9
2)
A101 (2,0) (2,0) (2,0) (2,0) (1,3) (1,3) (4,2) (4,2)
A110 (1,3) (1,3) (4,2) (4,2) (2,0) (2,0) (2,0) (2,0)
A111 (1,3) (1,3) (3,5) (6,4) (2,0) (2,0) (2,0) (2,0)


, (46)
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Figure 2: N-stage centipede game.
where A j1 j3 j5 = P
(1)
j1 ⊗U
(3)
j3 ⊗U
(5)
j5 and B j2 j4 j6 = P
(2)
j2 ⊗U
(4)
j4 ⊗U
(6)
j6 . The game given by (46) extends (42) to
local operations on |Ψ〉〈Ψ|. If player 1 and 2 restrict their strategies, for example, to P(1)0 ⊗U (3)j3 ⊗U
(5)
j5 and
P(2)0 ⊗U (4)j4 ⊗U
(6)
j6 , j3, . . . , j6 ∈ {0,1}, bimatrix (46) boils down to (42) (with the unique equilibrium outcome
(2,0)). In general, game (46) has another Nash equilibrium
(A100,B110) = P
(1)
1 ⊗P(2)1 ⊗U (3)0 ⊗U (4)1 ⊗U (5)0 ⊗U (6)0 (47)
that is not available in the classical game. Moreover, profile (47) implies pair of payoffs (9/2,9/2), that is the best
possible symmetric outcome in (42) (see, the payoff polytope in Fig. 1).
The main advantage of model (40)-(41) or equivalently (22)-(24) is that a classical normal form game and its quan-
tum counterpart have similar complexity. In particular, given any 2-person finite extensive game with k strategies
for each player, the normal form game implied by scheme (40)-(41) is just a bimatrix 2k× 2k game. As a result,
there is no significant difference in the problem of determining Nash equilibria in both games.
Example 3 (N-stage centipede game) Let us consider a centipede game where this time the number of stages is
any even integer n for n≥ 2. The extensive form for this game is given in Fig. 2. Similar to the four-stage centipede
game, the n-stage case has also the unique equilibrium outcome (2,0). Rational players choose action S at their
own information sets even though the game enables the players to obtain the payoffs approximate to the number of
stages. We have learned from the preceding example that there is a unique, symmetric, and pareto-optimal Nash
equilibrium if (42) is extended to (46). It turns out that the result is valid in the general case. That is, there is a
Nash equilibrium that implies the payoff n+ 1/2 for both players (pair of payoffs (n+ 1/2,n+ 1/2) is indeed a
paretooptimal outcome since it is the midpoint of the segment whose endpoints are (n− 1,n+ 1) and (n+ 2,n)).
In order to prove the existence of that equilibrium, let us generalize (43) and (44) to an arbitrary n-stage centipede
game. Since there are two players and n information sets in the game, the positive operator H and the players’
strategies are given by (40) and (41) for k = 2. We assume that players 1 and 2 perfom their local operators on
qubits with odd and even indices, respectively. Thus, the map ξ : {3,4, . . . ,n+ 2}→ {1,2} is given by formula
ξ (x) =
{
1 if x is odd
2 if x is even. (48)
The appropriately generalized payoff operators take the form
(M1,M2) = 1⊗1⊗
(
(2,0)∑
x2...xn∈{0,1}
|0x2 . . .xn〉〈0x2 . . .xn|
+(1,3)∑
x3...xn∈{0,1}
|10x3 . . .xn〉〈10x3 . . .xn|
+(4,2)∑
x4...xn∈{0,1}
|110x4 . . .xn〉〈110x4 . . .xn|+ . . .
+(n,n− 2)∑
xn∈{0,1}
|11 . . .10xn〉〈11 . . .10xn|
+(n− 1,n+ 1)|11 . . .10〉〈11 . . .10|
+(n+ 2,n)|11 . . .11〉〈11 . . .11|
)
. (49)
Let us consider the state |Ψ〉 ∈ (C2)⊗n,
|Ψ〉= |1010 . . .1010〉+ |1010 . . .1011〉√
2
(50)
9
and a strategy profile U∗⊗V ∗ such that
U∗ = P(1)1 ⊗
⊗
y∈ξ−1(1)
U (y)0 and V
∗ =

P(2)1 ⊗⊗
y∈ξ−1(2),y,n+2
U (y)1

⊗U (n+2)0 . (51)
First note that strategy profile U∗⊗V ∗,
U∗⊗V ∗ = |11〉〈11|⊗1(3)⊗σ (4)x ⊗1(5)⊗σ (6)x ⊗·· ·⊗1(n−1)⊗σ (n)x ⊗1(n+1)⊗1(n+2) (52)
implies the payoffs
tr[(U∗⊗V ∗)H (U∗⊗V ∗)Mi] = n+ 12 for i = 1,2. (53)
Let U = P(1)j1 ⊗
⊗
y∈ξ−1(1)U
(y)
jy be an arbitrary player 1’s strategy. If j1 = 0, then
(U ⊗V ∗)H (U ⊗V ∗) = |01〉〈01|⊗
(
U (3)j3 ⊗·· ·⊗U
(n+1)
jn+1
)
|01 . . .0100〉〈01 . . .0100|
(
U (3)j3 ⊗·· ·⊗U
(n+1)
jn+1
)
. (54)
Since player 1 cannot affect the system of (n+ 2)th qubit, we have
max⊗
y∈ξ−1(1)U
(y)
jy
tr[(U ⊗V ∗)H (U ⊗V ∗)M1] = n < n+ 12 . (55)
In the case of j1 = 1,
(U ⊗V ∗)H (U ⊗V ∗) = |11〉〈11|⊗
(
U (3)j3 ⊗·· ·⊗U
(n+1)
jn+1
)
|ϕ〉〈ϕ |
(
U (3)j3 ⊗·· ·⊗U
(n+1)
jn+1
)
, (56)
where |ϕ〉 = (1/√2)(|11 . . .10〉+ |11 . . .1〉). From (53), we know that player 1 gets n+ 1/2 if U = U∗. Thus,
the form of (49) implies that U , U∗ would increase the player 1’ payoff only if U made the magnitude of the
amplitude of |11 . . .1〉 higher that 1/√2. However, it is not possible because of the form of U . As a result, we
have proved that U∗ is a player 1’ best response to V ∗ over all her pure strategies. Using a similar argument to one
concerning the equivalence of (10) and (12), we conclude that U∗ is a player 1’ best response to V ∗ over all her
(pure and mixed) strategies. In similar way, we can show that player 2’ strategy V ∗ is a best response to U∗.
4 Conclusions
The aim of our research was to formalize our idea about the MW-type schemes. As a result, we have showed
that the players’ strategies do not have to be unitary operators or even superoperators in the quantum game. Apart
from unitary operators, they may include projectors that determine the state on which the unitary operations are
performed. Thus, the initial state does not have to be a density operator. Certainly, the scheme is in accordance
with the laws of quantum mechanics. The resulting state is given by a density operator, and therefore the payoff
measurement is well-defined. A positive point of the scheme is a way it can be considered. Given a bimatrix game
the scheme outputs a bimatrix game. Consequently, it implies similar complexity in finding optimal strategies
for the players. In addition, our model enables us to consider extensive games via the normal representation.
Moreover, the example of the general centipede game has proved that the analysis does not have to be limited to
simple games. We suppose that this argument may attract the attention of researchers to the refinement of the MW
scheme.
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